steel, rubber, and electrical manufacturing industries and divide those individuals among different trade unions. When it became clear to union leaders on the Committee for Industrial Organization that such a system would not work well for industrial workers, they withdrew from the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).
CIO leaders quickly established the United Automobile Workers Union, the Steelworkers Union, the Rubber Workers Union, and the Electrical Workers Union, and these new entities began to organize the manufacturing facilities in their respective industries. Although many employers initially opposed union organization, both the new Labor Board and strong union efforts overcame employer opposition. The vast majority of industrial workers desired a collective voice, and they selected industrial unions to represent them. From the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 until the Taft-Hartley Act amendments in 1947, labor organizations could obtain Labor Board certification through either secret ballot elections or "any other suitable method" to determine if a majority or workers in an appropriate bargaining unit desired a collective voice. In many cases, once it became clear that a majority of employees in particular bargaining units had signed authorization cards designating specific unions as their bargaining agents, employers voluntarily extended recognition to those labor organizations without the need to utilize the Labor Board election process.
During the 1940s and 1950s, competition between AFL and CIO affiliates was significant, and private sector union membership grew from 15 percent in 1935 to 35 percent in 1955. 6 At that time, AFL and CIO unions decided to reunite in the AFL-CIO.
Despite recent predictions by some persons opposed to changes in the current labor laws suggesting that increased union membership would greatly increase unemployment, the U.S. did not experience such a problem when unions represented over one-third of the labor force. What we did see during that period was a willingness of employers to share firm success with workers in the form of generous wages and fringe benefits, creating a sizable blue-collar middle class. Nonetheless, corporate leaders were becoming concerned about diminishing profits caused by increased labor costs generated through the collective bargaining process. 8 As a result, a growing number of unorganized firms decided to work harder to prevent the unionization of their employees.
American business leaders also engaged in political activity to limit the rights and economic power possessed by labor organizations and their supporters. In 1947, they induced Congress to enact the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 9 amendments to the NLRA. These statutory changes prohibited a number of unfair labor practices by labor organizations, and restricted the capacity of unions to employ secondary activity to enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis primary employers. The LMRA amendments ended the right of the Labor Board to certify bargaining agents except through secret ballot elections, and eliminated the ability of labor organizations to control the supply of labor through closed shop agreements that required employers to hire only persons Business leaders are vehemently opposed to the card-check certification provision and the first contract arbitration mandate, and they are working diligently to prevent the enactment of the EFCA in its current form. If labor union officials and Democratic supporters of the EFCA refuse to consider possible modifications that might enable them to obtain a cloture vote in the Senate, it is doubtful an actual vote on the merits will result. This article will explore the different provisions of the EFCA and will propose modifications that might make that proposed law more palatable to employers.
II. CARD CHECK CERTIFICATION
Many opponents of the EFCA card check certification provisions assert that true industrial democracy can only be preserved by way of traditional secret ballot elections. 
III. TREBLE DAMAGE AWARDS FOR UNLAWFULLY TERMINATED UNION SUPPORTERS
The injunctive remedy sparingly. This is why it takes so long for discriminatees to obtain reinstatement orders. If Congress were to add Section 8(a)(3) discharges to Section 10(l), unlawfully terminated union supporters would gain expeditious reinstatement. This would be highly beneficial for those individuals, and it would minimize the continuing negative impact of their public terminations on their coworkers.
IV. FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION
The most controversial provisions in the EFCA are those pertaining to labor organizations that have been certified by way of card checks or secret ballot elections but that have been unable to obtain initial contracts through the collective bargaining process. This would obviate the need for first contract arbitration.
If the first contract arbitration provision is retained in the EFCA, economically weak labor organizations may decide that they have nothing to lose by invoking such procedures. Since it would be difficult to imagine arbitrators awarding unions benefits less beneficial than those being offered by employers at the bargaining 
V. CONCLUSION
The NLRA no longer protects the rights of employees who desire union representation. Despite the fact the vast majority of workers would like some form of collective voice to counterbalance the economic power possessed by their corporate employers, most have been unable to achieve such representation. Employers have a substantial advantage over organizing unions due to both their economic power and the fact they have unlimited means to communicate their anti-union messages to employees.
Business success is attributable to three critical groups: (1) the shareholders who provide the investment capital; (2) the managers who direct the business; and (3) the employees who produce the goods or services. Over the past several decades, rank-and-file workers have become the junior partners in firm success, but the junior partners in firm failure.
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Congress should seriously consider some form of EFCA that would level the playing field and guarantee employees the right to select bargaining representatives if they wish to have a collective voice.
The use of authorization cards to obtain union certification would make it easier for labor unions to organize employees. To minimize the impact of union coercion or social pressure, unions could be required to sign up 60 or 67 percent of unit personnel before they could be certified. To guarantee union supporters an equal opportunity to spread their pro-union message, employers could be required to provide union supporters with the same means of communication they employ to spread their anti-union messages.
If Congress continues to believe in the sanctity of secret ballot elections, they could amend the NLRA to require the Labor Board to conduct representation elections within five or ten days after election petitions are filed. This might even be accomplished by directing the Labor Board to use mail-in ballots that could be sent to eligible employees shortly after certification petitions have been filed. The most controversial part of the EFCA involves the provisions that would mandate first contract arbitration after 120 days of unsuccessful bargaining. This would constitute a significant change in existing American labor law and it would ignore the fact that newly certified unions often fail to obtain first contracts. To limit arbitral discretion if these procedures are adopted, Congress should direct arbiters to select between the final offers of labor and management on an issue-by-issue basis. They could alternatively require only non-binding arbitration in which the arbitrators would decide the underlying factual and economic issues and make public recommendations the parties would not be obliged to accept, but would have to consider when they returned to the bargaining table.
